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ABSTRACT: Under certain conditions the optimal insurance policy will offer full coverage above a 
deductible, as Arrow and others have shown long time ago. Interestingly, the same design of insu-
rance policies applies in case of a single loss and ex-ante moral hazard. However, many insurance 
policies provide coverage against a variety of losses and the possibilities for the insured to affect 
the probabilities of each possible loss might be substantially different. The optimal design of a insu-
rance contract providing coverage against different losses therefore should generally differ from the 
standard form under moral hazard.  
 
The paper concentrates on  the conditions under which the standard insurance contract holds under 
moral hazard and more than one loss. It gives some evidence that many insurance contracts should 
be split up. The main result is, that the relative changes of probabilities due to precautious activities 
are decisive. On the other hand, under moral hazard it is rarely ever optimal to combine two losses 
in one insurance contract prescribing only a single deductible for both losses if both losses can oc-
cur simultaneously.  
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1                                                                                           1. Introduction 
1. Introduction 
Since the early contribution by Arrow (1963), the optimal design of insurance 
contracts has been discussed widely in the literature. Arrow states that under cer-
tain conditions an optimal insurance policy will offer full coverage above a non-
negative deductible. Authors like Raviv (1979) and others1 have extended Ar-
row’s result. At the end of his article Raviv (1979, 261) addresses the important 
question of how to deal with multiple losses and concludes that “the results re-
garding optimal insurance policies hold unchanged when the insured faces more 
than one risk, when the loss considered is the loss from all those risks”. 
Since moral hazard is recognized as being one of the most important limiting fac-
tors in insurance, it would be interesting to investigate if an optimal insurance pol-
icy under moral hazard would look substantially different from the standard con-
tract described before, i.e. when one insurance policy covers many different kinds 
of losses. This question is relevant for practice in several aspects:  First, it should 
give some hints on what kind of insurance policies we can expect to become fea-
sible in future and what limits due to moral hazard might continue to exist. This 
applies especially to so called ‘umbrella-policies’ that are supposed to provide 
protection against a wide range of risks individuals are exposed to.2 Second, we 
would be provided with a sort of yardstick to analyze whether insurance contracts 
we observe in practice are appropriate or whether they should be redesigned. 
Thinking for example of health insurance, one finds that it covers a wide range of 
risks reaching form curing a cold up to rescuing an insured from death by apply-
ing the latest medical technology in a single policy.  
However, despite its importance, all the early articles on optimal insurance con-
tracts are not explicitly concerned with moral hazard in insurance contracts, but 
simply assume that the insurer faces increasing costs per unit of coverage, which 
usually is the case if moral hazard is present. It was not until the 80s that moral 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Mossin (1968), Moffet (1977) or Schlesinger (1981). Gollier and Schlesinger (1996) show, that 
Arrows result can be proofed using only second-degree stochastic-dominance arguments. 
2  In contrast to Gollier and Schlesinger (1995), who stress the advantages of a unique insurance contract to 
cover all sources of risk, this paper argues that, because of moral hazard, it might be preferable to cover 
risks by separate contracts rather than by one policy.  
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hazard problems in the design of insurance contracts were addressed directly. 
Winter (2000) provides an excellent survey. Specifically, he finds that regarding 
ex-ante moral hazard or (synonymously) self-protection, the optimal insurance 
policy for a single loss and one prevention activity is designed exactly as sug-
gested by Arrow and Raviv: Full reimbursement above a deductible. Although 
Winter does not investigate multiple losses, it would be tempting to conclude that 
the design of an optimal insurance policy should not be influenced by self-
protection and that Raviv’s result for multiple losses should also hold when there 
is the possibility of self-protection. 
However, moral hazard should make a difference as soon as the possibilities of 
influencing or the incentives to influence the probability of all these incidents are 
not the same. Just consider a household contents insurance policy, covering the 
risk of burglary as well as the risk of a lightning strike or a fire. In such a situa-
tion, our experience with insurance models would suggest different treatment of 
different types of risk in insurance contracts to be in the insurer’s as well as in the 
insured’s interest, since it would give scope for well-directed incentives for pre-
vention in insurance arrangements. After all, it is the aim of a deductible to reduce 
moral hazard and to make at least partial insurance possible. On the other hand, 
indemnity payments, that depend on the type of loss suffered contradict the in-
sured’s preferences for a safe income in exchange for a single premium. The aim 
of this paper therefore is to investigate the conditions under which the optimal de-
sign of an insurance policy insuring for multiple losses under moral hazard con-
tinues to be full reimbursement above a deductible. It will be shown that generally 
the standard result for multiple losses no longer holds under moral hazard. 
To address the problem, section 2 adopts a framework introduced by Schlesinger 
(1987) that allows for a wide range of interpretations. After reporting the funda-
mental result concerning the optimal design of an insurance contract for multiple 
losses without self-protection in section 2.1, section 2.2 introduces moral hazard; 
i.e. it is assumed that the insured’s self-protection activities cannot be observed by 
the insurer, who has to rely on proper incentives for self-protection instead. Sec-
tion 3 looks into more concrete interpretations of the model and their results. The 
analyses by Raviv (1979), Schlesinger (1987), and Winter (2000) will turn out to 
be special cases of the broader model used in this paper. Section 4 concludes. 
3  2. A general model   
  
2. A general model for analyzing the optimal design of  
    insurance contract 
2.1 Optimal insurance contract without moral hazard 
In order to provide a fairly general framework for studying the optimal design of 
insurance contracts, Schlesinger (1987) introduces a discrete model in which there 
are one state of no loss and three states of loss with arbitrary size , , and . 
This framework is flexible enough to allow analyses of a wide range of insurance 
contracts. For example one is free to define , , and  as the occurrence of a 
loss A, a loss B, and the simultaneous occurrence of both losses, respectively. The 
probability of these four states is  with . The expected utility of 
an insured consequently reads as: 
1L 2L 3L
1L 2L
∑
=
4
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with W  denoting the exogenous wealth of the individual, P  the premium paid to 
the insurance, and  the indemnity received from the insurance in state . 
Furthermore, the utility function U is assumed to be twice differentiable with 
 and U , indicating risk-aversion.  
0≥iI i
0>′U 0<′′
The insurance industry is assumed to be competitive; i.e. given the public infor-
mation on the probability of losses, the insurance premium cannot exceed the ac-
tuarially fair premium times a proportional loading ( )κ+1 , with 0>κ  represent-
ing the loading factor. This leads to the constraint: 
(2) . ( ) 01 4
2
=−+ ∑
=
PIp
i
iiκ
The optimal insurance contract without moral hazard can be derived by maximiz-
ing (1) w.r.t. all , s.t. (2). The first-order conditions read iI
(3) µκ =+
+−−′
)1(
)( ii ILPWU   for 42K=i , 
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where µ  is the Lagrange multiplier for the premium function (2). FOC (3) states 
that the individual’s marginal utility should be the same in all states of loss if 
. However, due to the loading, full insurance cannot be optimal. This leads 
to the optimal indemnity function prescribing a deductible  and full reim-
bursement for losses that exceed the deductible: 
0>iI
0>d
(4)  


>−
≤=
dLdL
dL
I
i
i
i for
for0*
This result has been proved by Arrow (1971), Raviv (1979), Schlesinger (1987), 
and Gollier and Schlesinger (1996). Note that losses are arbitrary. As men-
tioned before, we are free to define , , and  as the occurrence of a loss A, 
a loss B, and the simultaneous occurrence of both losses, respectively. For the op-
timal indemnity being zero or offering full reimbursement the sum of both losses 
is decisive. 
iL
1L 2L 3L
2.2 Optimal insurance contract for multiple losses under moral hazard 
To investigate the effects of moral hazard in a more general model, we now allow 
for self-protection activities. To be more concrete, let there be two self-protection 
activities called  and . These activities appear as costs in the individual’s 
utility function and affect the probabilities of the four states in the model, rather 
than the amount of loss in any particular state. A fairly general formulation to cap-
ture this effect is: 
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According to (5) the effect of each self-protection activity on both probabilities  
may be identical or different. It is also possible that one self-protection activity 
affects one probability only; as analysed below in section 3.2. However, since the 
insurer cannot observe the self-protection activities of the insured, the insured will 
invest in self-protection only if she has the incentive to do so. This leads to the 
incentive compatibility constraints 
(6) 
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4
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Besides the incentive compatibility constraint, the break-even constraint for the 
insurer has to be met. As before, the premium P  must, at least, cover his expected 
costs including the loading: 
(8) . ( ) 0),(1 4
2
≤−+ ∑
=
PIxxp
i
ibaiκ
The final constraint is that the indemnity must not be negative: 
(9) . 0≥iI
For an interior solution of the maximizing program, the incentive compatibility 
constraints can be replaced by the first order conditions. These read for (6) and (7) 
as 
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with  being shorthand for the insured’s utility in state i  and  
representing the insured’s expected marginal utility. Equations (10) and (11) state, 
that in an optimum the change in expected utility due to an increase of the self-
insurance activity has to equal the expected marginal utility of income. According 
to (5), in this model the latter is the marginal cost of self-insurance activities, 
since the prices of both self-insurance activities have been normalized to one. 
iU ∑
=
′=′
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1i
ii UpUE
The optimization problem can now be stated as a problem of Lagrange: Maximize 
(5) with respect to  s.t. (8), (9), (10), and (11). Disregard (9) for the mo-
ment and let 
42 II K
0≥aλ , 0≥bλ , and 0≥Pλ  be the shadow prices on constraints (10), 
(11), and (8) respectively. The resulting first-order conditions are: 
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with iii UUR ′′′−=
iU ′
 representing the Arrow-Pratt degree of absolute risk aversion. 
Since  is assumed to be positive, it follows from (14) that 
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Combining (14) for two states i  and , eliminating j Pλ , and solving for ji U ′′U  
yields the optimal relative marginal utility, 
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While the second term in the numerator and the denominator of  (15) mirrors the 
marginal effectiveness of preventive effort (fixed by the insured) on the probabili-
ties, the first capture the insured’s risk preferences., i.e. her risk aversion. Differ-
net effectiveness of prevention in equilibrium has two effects that work into dif-
ferent directions. First, if at least one of the prevention activities has a higher ef-
fect on the probability of state i  relative to state j , this increases the relative 
marginal utility ji UU ′′  calling for relatively less insurance coverage in state . 
Second, however, assuming decreasing absolute risk aversion, a decrease of net 
wealth in state i  relative to net wealth in state 
i
j  causes  to increase relative to 
 and relative marginal utility 
iR
jR ji UU ′′  to decrease again. Therefore, as is well 
known, an optimal insurance contract has to strike a balance between providing 
appropriate incentives for prevention and the individuals’ demand for insurance 
protection.  
A sufficient condition for the relative marginal utility ji UU ′′  to be 1 is that the 
fractions in the nominator and the denominator are the same, i.e., 
(16)  
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Since 0≥ba λλ , for U  a relative higher effect of prevention activity a  on 
 has to be compensated by a relative higher effect of prevention activity b  on 
 et vice versa. In this case, an optimal insurance contract would show one sin-
gle deductible for both losses. 
ji U ′=′
jp
ip
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3. Some interpretations of the solution 
In this section two special cases are investigated that give some more insights into 
the limits of designing optimal insurance policies under moral hazard. 
3.1 Self-protection affects probability of loss but not its amount 
For the first special case, we explicitly model different amounts of a loss which 
cannot be affected by the insured. However, as before,  the insured’s prevention 
activities affect the probability of a occurrence of the loss. Let the probability of 
occurrence be  and let state 1 in section’s 2.2 model represent the state 
of no loss which consequently has the probability 
),( ba xxpr
( )),(1 ba xxpr− . The model’s 
three other states then represent states of loss with different amounts of losses that 
occur with probabilities 2,),( hba pxxpr ⋅ , 3,) hb p,( a xxpr ⋅ , and  
with  (see figure 1).  
4,),( hba pxxpr ⋅
1
4
2
, =∑
=i
ihp
Figure 1: Prevention affects probability but not  size of loss 
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Note that self-protection has no effect on any . The four states of our model 
therefore have the following probabilities: 
ihp ,
(17) . 
( )
4,4
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1
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Differentiating , i , w.r.t. , ip 4..2= jx baj ,= , yields 
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Plugging (18) into (14) reveals the critical terms in the first bracket of (14) to be 
the same for all i . Therefore, ignoring restriction (9), the insured should 
always suffer the same out-of-pocket loss. If restriction (9) is taken into account, 
the optimal insurance contract again has the form 
4..2=
(19) , 
 ≥−=
otherwise,0
 if, DLDL
I
that is full reimbursement above a nonnegative deductible . This is exactly the 
solution Winter (2000) presents for one prevention activity only. It turns out to be 
a special case of our more general analysis.  
D
3.2 Two different losses and one cumulative loss 
For the second special case suppose that there are two different kinds of losses 
which can occur alone or can happen both in a certain period of time. For exam-
ple, think of two different kinds of illness. Let  and  be the probability of 
sickness 1 and sickness 2 respectively. The four states of the model then are de-
fined as follows: 
1pr 2pr
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Differentiating these probabilities w.r.t.  and to  yields ax bx
(21)  
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To see if the out-of-pocket loss in case of sickness 1 in an optimal insurance con-
tract should be the same as in case of sickness 2, ij xp ∂∂  and for  
and  from (20) and (21) have to be plugged into (14). The resulting equa-
tions read as: 
ip 42K=j
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A sufficient condition for the out-of-pocket loss to be the same in all three states 
is again that the values in the parentheses are the same in (22), (23), and  (24). 
However, combining the terms in parentheses in (22) with those in  (24) and  
terms in (23) with those in  (24) yields: 
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(25) 
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(26) 
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Neither of the two conditions, (25) and (26), can be met if both activities,  and 
, are prevention activities reducing the probability of a sickness. It is therefore 
unreasonable to justify the same out-pocket-loss in all states which calls for some 
elements of co-insurance to be incorporated in an optimal policy. Furthermore, 
according to the considerations in section 2.2., deductibles and co-insurance rates 
will generally differ for both losses. 
a
b
4. Conclusion 
The literature on the optimal design of insurance policies concentrates on settings 
where there is no moral hazard at all. Unambiguous optimal contracts in case of 
ex-ante moral hazard are derived for single losses only. Since this situation is un-
satisfactory in the light of existing insurance contracts this paper investigates mul-
tiple losses and two self insurance activities. 
Although it was not possible to derive an optimal insurance contract under moral 
hazard in general, the model presented here provides some useful insights. The 
most important one is that a policy offering full insurance above a deductible is 
appropriate under certain conditions only, but not in general. It has been shown 
i.e. that it is never optimal to combine two losses in one insurance contract with 
the same deductible for all losses if both losses can occur simultaneously. This 
gives rise to the idea that many insurance contracts that provide for a single de-
ductible for different losses might be ill-designed.  
Furthermore, the model gives some evidence that ‘umbrella-policies’, providing a 
stop-loss insurance against a complete range of losses, will probably remain un-
feasible despite of their attractive properties for the insured. Since no general op-
timal policy for covering several losses under moral hazard could be derived, it 
might remain more sensible to cover these several losses by separate policies, 
each designed to give appropriate incentives for prevention. 
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